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Abstract
Leaders’ misbehaviors may durably undermine the credibility of the state. Using
individual level survey in the aftermath of geo-localized social protests in Africa, we
ﬁnd that trust in monitoring institutions and beliefs in social coordination strongly
evolve after riots, together with trust in leaders. As no signs of social unrest can be
recorded before, the social conﬂict can be interpreted as a sudden signal sent on a
leader’s action from which citizens extract information on the country’s institutions.
Our interpretation is the following. Agents lend their taxes to a leader with imperfect
information on the leader’s type and the underlying capacity of institutions to monitor
her. A misbehavior is then interpreted as a failure of institutions to secure taxes given
by citizens and makes agents (i) reluctant to contribute to the state eﬀort, (ii) skeptical
about the contributions of others.
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1 Introduction
In environments with imperfect access to information, an apparently minor signal may drive
beliefs in the viability of current institutions far from their previous levels. Once a signal is
sent that leaders extract rents, a large fraction of the population may not believe in social
cooperation anymore, refuse to invest in the state and dampen for quite a while the provision
of public goods. Agents revise their priors and infer that institutions are insuﬃcient to
protect their investments in the state. This rational update might lead to unstable dynamics
where an entire country switches in few days from national coordination to identity fall back.
Trust is not only a capital which slowly accumulates over decades. Beliefs in institutions
and leaders also reﬂect forward expectations, which are subject to large volatility.
In this paper, we investigate the evolution of trust toward leaders, monitoring institutions,
and beliefs in social cooperation immediately after social protests. We ﬁrst propose a stylized
model of public good provision where both the honesty of the leader and the punishing
capacity of institutions are unobserved by citizens. After having observed a protest–a noisy
signal of rent extraction by the leader–, citizens revise their priors not only on the executive,
but also on the monitoring capacity of institutions. This revision induces agents to be
more reluctant to contribute in the state eﬀort because their expectations on the likelihood
of retrieving the investment from their taxes are now lower. This mechanism may lead
to ineﬃcient state disband: a series of unjustiﬁed protests may induce agents to believe
(wrongly so) that their institutions are not able to prevent rent capture from leaders.
We test the main predictions of the model using a very localized match between the Afro-
barometer survey and a database on local conﬂicts in Africa–the Armed Conﬂict Location
and Event Dataset. Our identiﬁcation strategy takes advantage of the precise timing and
localization of riots and interviews. We identify the response of agents that are immediately
interviewed after the occurrence of a protest in their immediate surrounding. We use respon-
dents that are interviewed just before conﬂict to demonstrate that social protests are not
preceded by lower trust. Our ﬁndings indicate very large movements in opinions regarding
leaders in charge. More importantly, these changes also aﬀect beliefs in fundamentals, i.e. in
monitoring institutions such as the electoral commission or the army, and beliefs in national
cohesion. These sudden changes are of the same order of magnitude as long-term diﬀerences
between regions. The occurrence of a single riot during the previous month within a radius
of 20 kilometers reduces the probability for respondents to declare themselves as being part
of a nation (as opposed to being part of a local group) by up to a fourth of a standard
deviation. The same amplitude is recorded for trust in institutions that supposedly exert
some monitoring on the leaders in charge.
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Our theoretical framework also predicts that the learning process of citizens on their
institutional environment depends on the quality and quantity of information that they
already possess. The update should be stronger in the close neighborhoods of the riot,
or in places with few observations of protests in the past. We uncover attenuation in the
eﬀects of conﬂicts as the distance with the respondent location increases. Besides, we do
ﬁnd diﬀerences in the persistence of changes in beliefs along past exposure to social conﬂicts.
Beliefs seem to change slowly but durably in weakly exposed regions, and seem to change
only for a short period in regions frequently aﬀected by social conﬂicts. We also show that
the eﬀect is more pronounced for citizens that have a lower access to public goods.
In this paper, we interpret protests as events that reﬂect leaders’ misbehavior. An alter-
native interpretation is that protests are orthogonal to the past behaviors of leaders. Their
mere existence may signal the inability of leaders (and institutions) to prevent them. For
example, violent demonstrations of football fans may cast a doubt on the capacity of the
executive power to enforce the security of citizens. In order to discard this alternative mech-
anism, we present results for protests repressed by the government and show that the eﬀect
is actually stronger when the government does repress the protest. We also ﬁnd that the
responses of agents reﬂect the level of local public infrastructures.
An important contribution of our paper is to use very disaggregated data on conﬂicts and
thus capture a localized response both in time and in space. It echoes the call by Blattman
and Miguel (2010) to local (e.g. sub-national) investigation and identiﬁcation of causes
and consequences of conﬂicts. Each riot or protest is precisely located and matched with
respondents of the survey to extract how each violent event contribute to explain the local
sentiment toward institutions and leaders. The empirical strategy relies on the interaction
of the geographic location of respondents and the timing of the survey: we identify the
responses of individuals interviewed immediately after the occurrence of a protest in their
surroundings–within the next 30 days after an event that occurred in a 20 kilometers radius.
The focus on social conﬂicts rather than on violent events–such as wars or killings–is an
original feature of this paper that makes it distinct from recent studies on individual level
reaction to conﬂicts. Our ﬁndings on the eﬀects of social conﬂicts–decrease in trust toward
leaders and institutions, and increase in the sentiment to belong the local community–are
however consistent with results provided by most of these papers. For example, Becchetti
et al. (2011), Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) (building on Nunn 2008), Cassar et al. (2011),
and Rohner et al. (2012) (building on Rohner et al. 2011) report that exposure to violent
conﬂict tends to destroy generalized trust. Other studies such as Bellows and Miguel (2009),
Blattman (2009), and Gilligan et al. (2011) report that violence events reinforces local social
ties. These ﬁndings are in line with our observation that the relative reliance on local
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groups (as compared to the nation) tends to increase. Our empirical results also provide
new evidence on the way agents’ beliefs or behavior react in the aftermath of contextual
changes (see Grosjean et al. 2011 and Shayo and Zussman 2011 for example).
Overall, our results show that beliefs are very volatile. Distrust or trust allegedly reﬂect
forward-looking expectations in the fairness of the leaders in power and in the eﬃciency
of the institutional setting. Similar to Alesina et al. (2003) who highlight the existence
of self-fulﬁlled expectations, our model predicts that agents are tempted to invest less in
the state when they anticipate that such an investment will be ineﬃcient. Along the same
lines and in the spirit of Besley and Coate (2001), Besley and Ghatak (2001), and Besley
and Persson (2010, 2011), a low capacity to raise taxes keeps the state under the threat of
internal conﬂicts. The volatility of beliefs contrasts with the literature on persistence and
long-lasting resentments. On this issue, Nunn (2008) and Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) link
today’s development failure and distrust in Africa to historical slave trade intensity. Distrust
in the quality of institutions is one of the mechanisms through which such situations persist:
trust shapes the demand for regulation, and institutions (Aghion et al. 2010), a low level of
trust would aﬀect durably economic performance.
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we propose a simple
theoretical framework that highlights the interplay between signals of leader’s behavior and
citizens’ beliefs in the quality of institutions. We then provide empirical evidence that
support the theoretical predictions of the model in subsequent sections. Section 3 details
the methodology to construct the dataset, provides some descriptive statistics, documents
the exposure to civil conﬂicts and inclinations toward state institutions, and presents the
empirical strategy. In section 4, we present the empirical evidence constituting the main
results of the paper. Section 5 brieﬂy concludes.
2 Theoretical framework
In this section, we present a simple model where agents need to coordinate and invest in a
public good. To do so, they transfer control rights over the use of their taxes to a leader.
Both the honesty of this leader and the monitoring capacity allowed by the institutional
environment are imperfectly observed.
When the leader extracts private rents or reneges on an electoral promise, the society relies
on two punishing devices. First, institutions deprive the leader from a part of her revenues.
This quantity–the formal punishing capacity of institutions-is unobserved by citizens. In
addition, citizens can protest and capture part of the extracted rent on top of the punishment
already inﬂicted by institutions. This informal punishing power of the society is perfectly
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known.
We introduce a third party (an information agency) who gives information on the action
taken by the leader. The signal is observed by current citizens who decides then to incur the
cost of a protest in order to retrieve their tax revenues. The information is also processed
by future generations who revise their beliefs on the capacity of monitoring institutions to
avoid predatory behaviors by the leader. As such, the action of a leader in a certain period
may durably aﬀect the way agents invest in taxes and participate in state building. Citizens
will be reluctant to invest knowing that future leaders may easily capture the beneﬁts from
their investment without being punished.
2.1 Setting and hypotheses
Consider a simple economy that lasts for an inﬁnite number of periods. At each period, the
economy is populated by three types of agents. First, there are two risk-neutral citizens (say
that they are homogeneous groups, each representing half of the country) indexed by i = 1, 2.
These citizens are short-lived and new generations of citizens with the same features are born
every period. Second, there is a unit mass of potential leaders with unobserved altruism. We
exclude reelection concerns for leaders and assume that they are also short-lived. Finally,
there is an impartial and inﬁnitely-lived observer–the information agency–who observes the
actions of the leader and inform the citizens. This agent will be benevolent and can also be
considered as a group of active and benevolent citizens.
The citizens have linear preferences over the consumption of a unique ﬁnal good. This
good can be produced with a private technology delivering t units of ﬁnal goods for t units
invested, or with a public technology necessitating the intervention of the leader. If the leader
implements the public project in which citizens have invested T = t1+t2, each citizen receives
half of the total welfare returns RT ρ. We assume that R equals 0 with probability p and
R¯ otherwise. Let us assume that (i) R¯(1 − p) > 1, i.e. the public technology creates more
surplus than the private one (but is redistributed equally across agents), and (ii) ρ > 1,
i.e. there are some complementarities between citizens’ investments. Citizens voluntarily
contribute to the public project by providing t1, t2 ∈ {0, 1}. They cannot write a contract
and force the leader to implement the project.
At each period, a leader is randomly picked among the pool of potential leaders. Her
unique decision is to implement the public project or not. Leaders are equally eﬃcient
at producing the public good (R¯ and p are not leader-speciﬁc) but they diﬀer by their
incentives to do so. Once the leader is elected and taxes (voluntary contributions in the
public project) are collected, the leader can decide to implement the indivisible project
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which generates welfare for citizens but no private beneﬁts for her. The leader can also
divert resources from the project and capture tax revenues for private use. We assume here
that the implementation/diversion choice is binary. This choice depends crucially on her
unobserved altruism 1− ϕ, where ϕ (resp. 1− ϕ) is the weight attributed by the leader to
her own revenues (resp. the welfare of the agents) and is uniformly distributed over [0, 1]
across of potential leaders.
The role of the information agency is to signal a misbehavior of the leader in the absence
of public goods. The observer is benevolent but is not able to fully distinguish between
a misconduct from the leader and low investment’s return. The probability to signal a
misbehavior (resp. a project failure R = 0) conditional on a misbehavior (resp. a project
failure) is 1− s. The signal is observed by all citizens.
Finally, we impose very stylized assumptions on the post-extraction process. After a
rent extraction, two independent processes can make a dent in the leader’s revenues. First,
monitoring institutions incur a deadweight loss, a share α of the extracted funds. Second, if
at least one of the citizen decides to initiate a protest at cost c, a share β of the extracted
funds is retrieved and distributed equally to citizens. Naturally, after a protest, citizens
know whether the leader misbehaved or not.
All in all, the incentives for a leader to expropriate citizens depend on (i) the quality α of
monitoring institutions (standing for courts, army and electoral commission) and on (ii) the
informal power of citizens (which also depends on their capacity to detect a misbehavior).
Since the cost α ∈ {0, α¯} is a deadweight loss, we assume that citizens have imperfect
information on this quantity. They form priors on the quality of their institutions from past
observations of protests. In contrast, leaders can observe the value of α.
We impose three important assumptions. First, the recovery from citizens is independent
of the value of α conditional on the signal received by the information agency. Protests are
equally eﬃcient in any environment. Second, leaders base their decisions on the true α rather
than on citizens’ beliefs. Third, we don’t allow for renegotiation.1
Within each period, the timing is as follows: at the beginning of the period, new gen-
erations of citizens and leaders replace the old ones. They observe past protests and their
outcomes and form their priors. Then, (i) a leader is randomly drawn from the pool of
potential leaders; (ii) voluntary contributions are made and collected by tax authorities; (iii)
the leader decides whether to extract private rents or to create the public project; (iii’) con-
1In this framework, there would be some room for renegotiation (in the case of a riot, c will be lost).
Citizens could negotiate with the leader under the threat of the protest. For instance, leaders may be willing
to bribe the citizen at the origin of the protest. This possibility may be thought as group-speciﬁc state
investments, e.g. the provision of local public goods. The implications of the model would be unchanged
with renegotiation as long as the bargaining does not help the citizens to uncover the value of α.
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ditional on the public project being implemented, the stochastic return R is determined; (iv)
conditional on the public project delivering 0 or on a rent extraction, the observer sends a
signal; (v) citizens decide whether to protest or not and recover part of the leader’s revenues
conditional on a protest and a rent extraction.
2.2 Static equilibrium
Let us solve the problem backward. In a ﬁrst step, we will study the decision to protest.
Then, we will analyze the leader’s choice, given the threat of riots, the state of the institutions
and her own type. Finally, we will determine the conditions under which citizens favor the
public project over the private technology.
Decision to protest
Consider ﬁrst the decision to protest from citizens having invested t1 + t2. Denote S ∈
{E, I} the signal and a ∈ {E, I} the actual decision of the leader where I stands for an
implementation of the project, and E stands for an extraction. If the provision of public
goods is 0, the leader may have extracted the tax revenues for her personal beneﬁt (a = E)
or the leader has implemented an unsuccessful project (a = I).
P (S = E|a = E) = 1− s = P (S = I|a = I)
Consequently, after having received a signal of extraction S = E, the expected beneﬁt from
a protest is (1 − s)β(t1 + t2) to be shared between both citizens. The decision to protest
depends on whether c is greater or lower than (1− s)β(t1 + t2)/2. If the cost is larger than
this quantity, no one wants to incur the cost of a protest. Otherwise, c ≤ (1− s)β(t1+ t2)/2,
there are two symmetric equilibria where only one citizen protests. After having received a
signal of extraction I, the expected beneﬁt from a protest is sβ(t1 + t2) and the decision to
protest depends on the comparison between c and (1− s)β(t1 + t2)/2.
Denote χ(T ) the probability of a protest subsequent to an extraction, where T = t1 + t2.
Given the previous analysis, χ(T ) will either be equal to 1−s if a protest only follows positive
signals, i.e. S = E, 1 if protests follow any signal, or 0 if protests are too costly whatever
the signal.
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Decision to implement the project
Consider a leader with altruism 1 − ϕ. Her decision to implement the indivisible project
depends on the maximization of the following program:
max
a=I,D
ϕPa + (1− ϕ)Wa,
where Pa (resp. Wa) is the private expected beneﬁt (resp. aggregate citizens’ welfare) under
action a.2
Given the hypotheses and the outcome of a default, the private beneﬁt and the citizens’
welfare under the two actions can be written as:{
PI(T ) = 0,
WI(T ) = R¯(1− p)(T )ρ,
and
{
PE(T ) = [1− α− χ(T )β]T,
WE(T ) = χ(T )βT.
The leader is indiﬀerent between implementing the project given tax revenues T if ϕ˜ is
such that:
ϕ˜(T ) =
R¯(1− p)T ρ−1 − χ(T )β
1 + R¯(1− p)T ρ−1 − α− 2χ(T )β .
Leaders with ϕ > ϕ˜(T ) will default while the others will implement the project. ϕ˜(T )
is thus the ex-ante probability of project implementation (remember that ϕ is uniformly
distributed). Naturally, the lower the extraction capacity of leaders, the less likely a private
extraction. The incentives of the leaders to expropriate also diﬀer with the size of the overall
cake. The larger the collected tax revenues and the less likely an expropriation because (i)
implementing the project becomes then really attractive, and (ii) citizens may be more likely
to protest.
Decision to invest in the project
Let us determine the voluntary contributions of citizens. With probability ϕ˜(T ), agents
receive half of the welfare created by the indivisible project, and with probability (1− ϕ˜(T )),
citizens receive the proceeds of a potential protest.
Note that agents cannot contract here among themselves to ensure that the other party
is investing. Had they been able to coordinate and ﬁx both contributions together, the
condition for investment would have been R¯(1− p)2ρ−1ϕ˜(2) > 1. However, as in the hold-up
problem, agents don’t take into account the beneﬁts of their investment on others and the
condition for investing will be more stringent.
2For simplicity, we assume that leaders do not internalize the private costs c of a protest from citizens.
8
Remark that (0, 0) will always be a Nash equilibrium. We thus study under which
conditions an optimistic equilibrium may also exist.3 The condition under which (1, 1) is an
equilibrium is the following. When the other agent is expected to invest, the proﬁt under
investment Π(1, 1) should be higher than Π(0, 1) where
Π(1, 1) = ϕ˜(2) [WI(2)−WE(2)] +WE(2) + [ϕ˜(2) + (1− ϕ˜(2))p]χ(2)c,
and
Π(0, 1) = ϕ˜(1) [WI(1)−WE(1)] +WE(1) + [ϕ˜(1) + (1− [ϕ˜(1))p]χ(1)c.
Deﬁning ΔΠ = Π(1, 1)− Π(0, 1), this condition can be written as
ΔΠ(α, β, c, s, p, R¯) ≥ 0. (1)
Let us assume that agents coordinate on the (1, 1) equilibrium when the condition (1) is
satisﬁed. It can be easily checked that ΔΠ is increasing in the quality of formal monitoring
institutions α, and in the quality of informal institutions β. Similarly, through the probability
χ to see a protest, ΔΠ is increasing in the precision of the signal 1− s and decreasing in the
cost of launching a protest c. Finally, ΔΠ is decreasing in p for a ﬁxed (1− p)R¯ (the risk of
the project). When projects are risky, agents know that they will protest for nothing more
often.
Priors on the monitoring institutions
Until now, we have solved the problem for a known α. As citizens do not observe this
quantity, we need to determine the condition on their priors that ensures that they invest in
the state.
Assume that the condition (1) does not hold for α = 0, but holds for α = α¯. When
institutions are observed, poor institutions cannot sustain a good equilibrium while good
institutions are suﬃcient to ensure that both agents invest. Let us deﬁne the probability
μ ∈ [0, 1] such that:
μΔΠα=0 + (1− μ)ΔΠα=α¯ = 0.
When agents’ priors on the probability that α = 0 is higher than μ, they will not contribute
to tax revenues, otherwise, there exists a Nash equilibrium with contributions equal to 1
from both agents.
3We assume that ϕ˜(1)R¯(1− p) + (1− ϕ˜(1))βχ(1)/2 < 1 for any α, which ensures that citizens will never
invest alone in the public project. As is common in this kind of framework, (0, 0) is a Nash equilibrium and
there exists a pessimistic equilibrium under which citizens expect the others not to contribute.
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We have described so far the within-period mechanisms: the decision to invest from
agents depends on their priors on the punishing capacity of institutions. Priors are inherited
from the past and their position relatively to the threshold μ determines the investment in
the state from citizens. In the same vein as for the condition (1), it can be shown that μ is
higher when β is large. μ is also higher when the information is of good quality, or the cost
of a protest c is small.
The next section characterizes the determination and evolution of priors.
2.3 Beliefs’ update and state disband
In period t, newborns observe the past sequence of signals {P0, . . . , Pt−1} and form their
beliefs μt on P (α = 0).
Suppose that some priors μt−1 are inherited from the past and the generations born
in period t has observed a protest revealing a failure to provide the public good from the
previous leader. Citizens update their priors on the monitoring process in a bayesian way.
Denote ψ(α) the probability to identify an extracting leader in a country with institutions
α. With probability ϕ˜α(2), the leader extracts. If χ(2) = 1, an extracting leader is always
detected and ψ(α) = ϕ˜α(2). If χ(2) = 1− s, an extracting leader is only detected when the
signal is positive, i.e. if:
ψ(α) = χ(2)ϕ˜α(2) + (1− ϕ˜α(2))p(1− χ(2)).
With some probability, a well-behaved leader may create a failure. But, as the failure is
guaranteed when the leader misbehaves, the probability is always strictly decreasing in α
(since p < 1 and s < 1/2).
The Bayesian update process after having experienced a unique protest is:
μt =
ψ(0)μt−1
ψ(0)μt−1 + ψ(α¯)(1− μt−1) . (2)
As knowledge keeps piling, the additional information is less and less informative. After
having experienced τ protests before period t and with uniform priors, we get:
μt =
ψ(0)τ
ψ(0)τ + ψ(α¯)t−τ
.
When agents have suﬃciently low priors on α, an extraction from leaders can lead to state
disband if the revision induces a posterior μt lower than μ. Since agents cannot observe the
action of the leader when they do not invest (there is no action), there might exist ineﬃcient
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state disband: no investment on the long-term despite good institutions α = α¯. Such a
regime may be fragile as small errors from agents (random investments) may help revealing
the quality of institutions. However, the cost of discovering the type of the leaders might
be quite high especially because groups cannot coordinate to make the test fruitful if the
project is actually implemented.
2.4 Predictions
The theoretical analysis presented above entails some simple and testable predictions.
First, the model supposes that protests follow a rent extraction from the leader in charge.
Accordingly, we should expect agents to revise their beliefs on the leader and the executive
power in the aftermath of a protest. This revision depends on the correlation χ between
protests and rent extraction (and thus an identiﬁcation of the leader’s type). This correlation
is lower in places where information is not reliable or in places with very high costs of setting
up a protest. The more precise the signal and the more likely protesters will uncover a rent
extraction.
Second, agents should not only revise their beliefs on the leader in charge but on the
quality of monitoring institutions as well. A signal of extraction leads to a protest. With
probability χ, this protest leads to a recovery of tax revenues from an extractive leader.
As shown by expression (2), this event modiﬁes the priors of agents on the capacity of
institutions to prevent rent capture. As explained above, the eﬀects should be lower when
the signal is noisy, either when the media source is imprecise or when an absence of public
goods is quite likely to be related with a project failure rather than a rent capture.
Third, the update of beliefs in institutions following a riot should impact the position
of priors relatively to the threshold above which citizens stop investing. The protest may
aﬀect the willingness of future generations to contribute in the state. As before, this eﬀect
should be ampliﬁed in environments with a good access to information and in places where
the returns on projects are less risky (the absence of public goods is a good signal of rent
extraction).
Fourth, protests in the model allow the agents to learn the reasons behind the absence of
public goods and incidentally to learn about their institutional framework. For a similar in-
stitutional environment, we expect inhabitants of places without a long history of past events
to revise more heavily their priors. Similarly, when fewer public projects are implemented,
citizens learn slowly and a riot should lead to a large update.
In our empirical analysis, we will test the basic predictions of the model, essentially on
the updates of beliefs in the quality of institutions and social coordination. We will also
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investigate heterogeneity in the revision. Finally, there is an alternative mechanism through
which protests or riots may be associated with changes of beliefs in institutions or leaders.
Leaders and state institutions may also be expected to prevent civil riots from occurring.
Accordingly, a protest may signal that the state is unable to contain the anger of citizens.
We will provide some evidence showing that protests create a higher discontentment when
the government actually represses them.
2.5 Discussion
The model is very stylized and some assumptions could be relaxed. For instance, the mech-
anisms described here would hold with only one citizen. The coordination problem before
investment would disappear then, leaving only a classic principal-agent framework. We con-
sider as a strong point that a model of public investment accounts for some coordination of
citizens. Another concern with the “one agent” version would be that renegotiation with the
leader would be easier and leaders may avoid ineﬃcient protests by redistributing ex-post
the proceeds of rent extraction.
In the model, we don’t allow for a renegotiation before a protest. The reason is that
we see the protest as being part of a long-run renegotiation process in which citizens try to
retrieve some of their taxes.
Finally, we assume that agents cannot perfectly observe the state of their institutions
while leaders can. We need this information asymmetry in order to ensure that the action
of the leaders reveals some information to the citizens.
The possibility implied by the presence of two agents oﬀers two natural extensions of this
model: (i) break the symmetry between groups, (ii) allow for more than two groups to exist.
With more groups, the probability to see an investment would decrease. Each group collects
a smaller and smaller part of their own eﬀort as the number of groups increases. The eﬀect
of having unequal groups (say in terms of size) on the overall capacity of the economy to
invest is more interesting but ambiguous. On the one hand, a larger group would protest
more often and constitute a bigger threat for leaders. On the other hand, keeping the same
assumptions on protests, this would transfer part of the investment from the bigger group
to the smaller one and alter the ex-ante investment of the majority. Intuitively, it is not
desirable to aﬀect the ex-ante incentives of the most important investor.
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3 Data and methodology
The following section describes the data sources and documents the construction of the local
exposure to conﬂicts. We then present descriptive statistics on the average respondent in the
Afrobarometer survey. Finally, we describe the empirical identiﬁcation strategy. In short,
we locate very precisely the respondents to our survey and compare individuals aﬀected
diﬀerently within the same region. This variation in exposure comes from (i) the proximity
to a riot, (ii) the timing of the interview (before or after the event).
Before discussing data and empirical speciﬁcations, a small disclaimer: we do not pretend
in this paper to analyze the causal eﬀect of a protest on expectations of agents. It is diﬃcult to
exclude that riots respond to an omitted variable that may itself inﬂuence beliefs. Instead, as
in the model, we consider that riots and protests are precisely the signals of this unobserved
discontentment. Note however that our identiﬁcation strategy relies on precise matching
across time and space between social conﬂicts and interviews, and suggests that protests are
not preceded by low trust in leaders, institutions or low beliefs in social coordination.
3.1 Data construction
The Afrobarometer is a qualitative survey conducted in 20 African countries.4 We use the
most recent rounds of this survey, i.e. rounds 3 and 4 conducted between 2005 and 2009,
for which we can identify the date of interview and the precise location of respondents.
All countries pooled together, we observe about 40, 000 individuals living in about 2, 300
districts and 220 regions.5 The Afrobarometer gives a very detailed picture of their opinions
regarding politics, religion, and social issues. In particular, the survey documents (i) trust
of individuals regarding leaders in power, the parliament, institutions such as the army or
the electoral commission , and (ii) the sentiment to belong to a community. We will use the
expression of the sentiment to be part of a nation as an indirect proxy for future national
cooperation (desire to participate in state building). As it is frequent with such surveys,
education, income, and households characteristics are very poorly documented. On a more
positive note, households can be located very precisely inside each region, which allows us
to reconstitute the local environment of households in terms of exposure to conﬂicts for
example. The reader interested in the detailed description of the method used to localize
respondents can refer to the online appendix.
4Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi,
Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
5In this paper, we refer to region as the ﬁrst level administrative area in a country. Information about
districts are used to locate respondents inside each region.
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The Armed Conﬂict Location and Event Dataset provides detailed information about
conﬂicts in almost all African countries from 1997 onwards. Available information include the
precise geographical coordinates, involved actors, the type of event (battles, riots, violences
against civilians), the outcome of the conﬂict and, whether the conﬂict was covered by
dominant media such as the BBC. More than 30, 000 of these events are documented and
classiﬁed along rough categories, i.e. riots, battles, lobbying, protests, peace agreements. In
this paper, we restrict ourselves to riots, protests, or violence against civilians. We refer to
these events as “social conﬂicts” and interpret them as signals of social unrest. In addition,
we take advantage of information on the repression of riots or protests and deﬁne events
repressed by the authorities (government, oﬃcial army, oﬃcial police) as “social conﬂicts
repressed by the government”. We also use information about local occurrences of battles
and other military events wars as control variables in estimations.6
From the precise geographical coordinates of events and districts, we match social conﬂicts
and Afrobarometer’s respondents if the event occurred within a k kilometers radius from the
place where the respondent is living. Although we arbitrary chose to set k equals to 20, we
also provide robustness checks of our results using k = 5, 10, 40. Together with the precise
dates of conﬂicts and interviews, this matching procedure allows us to construct the exposure
to both recent and past social conﬂicts at the individual level. For each individual, we deﬁne
the exposure to recent social conﬂicts as the number of conﬂicts over the month immediately
preceding the interview within the 20 kilometers radius. We deﬁne past exposure, i.e. the
propensity to be aﬀected by events, as the average number of events inside the same area
between 2000 and 2003 for respondents interviewed in Afrobarometer’s round 3, and between
2003 and 2006 for those interviewed in round 4. Except if diﬀerently speciﬁed, we use the
term “social conﬂicts” to refer to recent events. The precise localization of respondents allows
us to follow Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) and to construct the the distance to the coast as
control variables for long-run determinants of trust. In addition, as attitudes may diﬀer in
more populated places and that cities may also be more prone to social conﬂicts, we construct
from the Global Rural-Urban Mapping Project the population within a 20 kilometers around
each respondent.
Table 4, presented in the appendix, gives the average proﬁle of Afrobarometer’s respon-
dents and compares these characteristics along exposure to conﬂicts. In the right part of
the table, we focus on individuals living in places without any social conﬂict since 1997 and
individuals living in places with at least one social conﬂict since the same date. A large frac-
tion (two third) of the sample is unemployed or inactive and a about one half of respondents
6In the online appendix, ﬁgure 3 anecdotally illustrates the location of civil conﬂicts or riots as reported
in the ACLED dataset.
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has no education or has only attained primary school. In places where conﬂicts have been
reported in the past, surveyed individuals are relatively more educated.
We use a series of questions from the Afrobarometer to measure attitudes toward various
subjects. The common phrasing of these questions is following: “How much do you trust
each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say: The President? ”.
Answers are given on a four points ascending scale with 0 for “Not at all ”, 1 for “A little
bit”, 2 for “A lot”, and 3 for “A very great deal ”. In addition to the question about trust
in the president, we use questions related to “the opposition party”, “the ruling party”, “the
army”, “the electoral commission”, “the parliament”, “the local government”, and “traditional
leaders”. In addition we use a question capturing the extent to which a respondent deﬁnes
herself as being a member of the national community rather than of a “local” group. It is
measured on a ﬁve points scale using answers to the following question of the Afrobarometer:
“Let us suppose that you had to choose between being a [respondent’s nationality] and being a
[respondent’s ethnic group]. Which of the following best expresses your feelings? ”.7 Answers
are given on a ﬁve points scale. The lowest item is “I feel only [respondent’s ethnic group] ”,
the third item is “I feel equally [respondent’s nationality] and [respondent’s ethnic group] ”,
whereas the highest highest item is “I feel only [respondent’s nationality] ”. In what follows,
we refer to this question as “national feeling”.
Table 5, presented in appendix, gives the average answers to the questions described
earlier and unsurprisingly documents that trust in the president or in the ruling party is
higher in places without past social conﬂicts or in places with no social conﬂicts during the
past month. These cross-sectional diﬀerences are in line with the general intuition that social
protests are the expressions of mistrust.
3.2 Estimation strategy
Our objective is to identify the response following social conﬂicts of a set of subjective
opinions regarding leaders or institutions. To achieve this, we take advantage of the structure
of the data presented above and rely on a comparison of individuals within the same region.
The match between respondents and conﬂicts oﬀers room for heterogeneity in the imme-
diate exposure to conﬂicts within the same region. Two individuals in the same region may
be aﬀected diﬀerently depending on their exact location. We exploit this variation and in-
teract the proximity to the event with the time at which the interview took place. Formally,
7This phrasing is the phrasing of the fourth round of Afrobarometer. In the third round of the survey,
the second part of the question is “Which of these two groups do you feel most strongly attached to? ”
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the baseline model we estimate using ordinary least squares is following:
yi = α + βCjt +
n∑
k=1
γkx
k
i +
m∑
k=1
φkX
k
j + Ir + εi, (3)
where individual i lives in place j inside region r and is interviewed at date t. Variable y
denotes the answer to one of the questions presented above. Cjt is the number of social con-
ﬂicts within a 20 kilometers radius around place j during the month immediately preceding
the interview conducted at date t. Vector x is a set of observable characteristics of individual
i. Vector X is a set of observable characteristics of place j, e.g. past conﬂicts, distance to
the coast. Ir is a region ﬁxed eﬀect for region r and ε is the error term. In this equation,
parameter β captures how attitudes diﬀer in places recently aﬀected by social conﬂicts.
An implicit but important hypothesis on which this estimation strategy relies on is that
the decision to conduct interviews is unrelated to the prevalence of social conﬂicts. This
decision can be divided into two distinct steps: the choice of places and the choice of dates.
For obvious reasons, it is diﬃcult to argue or to test that long-run conﬂicts, whatever their
type, do not inﬂuence the choice of places where interviews will be conducted. The second
part of the decision can however be tested by looking at the occurrences of social conﬂicts
around the time when interviews were conducted. In ﬁgure 1, we plot the daily empirical
probability that social conﬂicts occur in places surveyed in the Afrobarometer. The prob-
ability of social conﬂicts is not diﬀerent before or after the date of interview. Formal tests
also strongly reject this hypothesis for any combination of time-windows around the date of
interview.
4 Empirical evidence
This section presents the empirical results about beliefs in cooperation at the national level
in the aftermath of social conﬂicts. We ﬁrst focus on the evolution of beliefs in leaders in
power, institutions which monitor the leader and alternatives to the state. Then, we provide
complementary results exploiting the heterogeneity of the response.
4.1 Eﬀect of civil conﬂicts on beliefs in national cooperation
In what follows, the estimated model is always given by equation (3) and only the outcomes
will vary.8
8We only present estimated coeﬃcients associated with the explanatory variables of interest, i.e. with
recent social conﬂicts and recent social conﬂicts repressed by the government. Table 6 in appendix presents
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Our theoretical framework predicts that agents will revise their beliefs in the quality of
leaders in charge in the aftermath of a social conﬂict. Panel A of table 1 displays evidence
that trust in leaders reported by respondents strongly deteriorates if riots or protests occurred
in their neighborhood during the month that preceded the interview. Here we consider trust
in the actual leader and potential alternative leaders, i.e. the president, the ruling party and
the opposition party. Local conﬂicts in the month before the interview are associated with
lower trust in current leaders and higher trust for competitors. In the ﬁrst three columns
of the table, we use the total number of social conﬂicts during the past month as variable
of interest. Focusing only on events repressed by the government (in the right part of the
table), the penalty imposed on the president and the ruling party is around twice larger.
The model crucially predicts that individuals revise their beliefs on fundamentals–the
quality of institutions–once a signal of social unrest has been observed. Panel B of table 1
focuses on institutions exerting a monitoring power on the leaders, i.e. the army, the electoral
commission, and the parliament.9 Estimated coeﬃcients show that trust in institutions with
a monitoring power over leaders plunges in the aftermath of social conﬂicts. There is a
strong negative eﬀect on trust in the electoral commission. As we focus on riots or protests
repressed by the government, the relationship between trust in the army becomes strongly
and signiﬁcantly negative. The army is indeed likely to be one of the actors of the repression.
Trust in the parliament however does not seem to suﬀer in the aftermath of the riots. Overall,
the trust in these monitoring institutions decreases together with trust in the president.
In panel C of table 1, we explore how trust in alternatives to the state and the beliefs
in national coordination react to recent riots or protests. To achieve this, we use trust in
the local government and in traditional leaders as proxies for the former, and the subjective
membership of national community for the latter. These proxies capture how much agents
are willing to invest locally rather than in national projects. Institutional alternatives to the
state do not end up being stronger in absolute terms after a protest. Social conﬂicts reduce
trust in the local government and leaves trust in traditional leaders unchanged. In relative
terms however, people are more likely to deﬁne themselves as belonging to a local or ethnic
group as belonging to the national community. This is especially true for riots or protests
that have been repressed by the government. All in all, the sentiment to be part of a nation
decreases following social conﬂicts.
As regards the amplitude of these eﬀects, one more social conﬂict during the month
preceding the interview reduces trust in the president by the equivalent of 15% of a standard
the estimated relationships between all co-variates and our nine dependent variables when the variables of
interest, i.e. social conﬂicts, are not included in the regression.
9In many African countries, these institutions are considered by a large part of the population as tools
for the leaders to lean on without any real monitoring power.
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deviation of average trust computed across districts. On the opposite, trust in the opposition
party or in traditional leaders increases by about 10% of a standard deviation following
such an event. Similarly, the subjective membership of the national community is reduced
by about 15% of standard deviation if there is one more social conﬂict repressed by the
government around the place during the past month. Such eﬀects are very important. One
conﬂict is suﬃcient to bridge the gap of trust in the president between rural and urban
areas. Similarly, the subjective membership of the national community decreases as much
as to bridge the gap between post-secondary educated respondents and respondents without
formal education. These rough comparisons suggest that the immediate eﬀects of social
conﬂicts on most of the dependent variables we used is sizeable and similar to long-run
heterogeneity.
To summarize, these ﬁndings document a high volatility of trust toward nationwide in-
stitutions and belief about social coordination. Beliefs, and trust in particular, are heavily
rooted in culture, but national cohesion is also frequently updated and strongly aﬀected by
sudden signals. In other words, such beliefs are not static, they have a substantial dynamic
component.
Following our interpretation that conﬂicts are signals sent or the quality of a leader or
the manifestations of a recent discovery, we analyze below whether the impulse response
that we observe one month after the conﬂict was already present before. Given the strong
auto-correlation of conﬂicts across space and time, it may be argued that our core result–
beliefs deteriorate in the aftermath of social conﬂicts–is a by-product of a long-run deleterious
environment, which both generate conﬂicts and distrust. In that case, we would only capture
the fact that the obnoxious environment was deeply-rooted in the district. However, results
presented below suggest that social conﬂicts can be interpreted as localized signals, revealing
some information on the environment. Indeed, (i) social conﬂicts are not preceded by lower
levels of trust regarding leaders or social coordination, and (ii) the response to social conﬂicts
is stronger close to the focal point.
In table 2, we run the same regressions as above, but replace the number of conﬂicts
that occurred during the month immediately preceding the interview by conﬂicts that occur
during the month immediately following the interview. We hardly ﬁnd any evidence to
support that riots were preceded by low trust levels. Table 2 reproduces the main results
presented in table 1 and captures trust as a function of conﬂicts occurring the month after
the interview. No systematic pattern appears in the signs of the diﬀerent coeﬃcients. In
addition, most of them are not statistically signiﬁcant. The only exceptions are estimated
coeﬃcients of conﬂicts in columns 3 and 12 where the dependent variable is trust in the
ruling party. Here, estimated coeﬃcient are statistically signiﬁcant, but positive (while the
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baseline displayed negative coeﬃcients). Conﬂicts do not seem to be preceded by a long-run
obnoxious climate.
In tables 7, 8, and 9 presented in appendix, we change the radius (5, 10, and 40 kilometers)
used to match Afrobarometer’s respondents and conﬂicts and estimate the amplitude of the
response for those diﬀerent radius. Interestingly, the eﬀects fade with the distance without
disappearing. For example, the eﬀect of social conﬂicts on trust in the president is equal to
0.080 for the 5 kilometers radius (table 7), to 0.075 for the 10 kilometers radius (table 8), to
0.070 for the 20 kilometers radius (table 1), and to 0.065 for the 40 kilometers radius (table
9). Two interpretations may arise. First, the access to information may restrict the reach
of a signal which should be of interest of every citizens in the country–national grief, local
reach. Second, the information is spread across the country but is only relevant for a certain
region (e.g. inhabitants of a district learn that no new hospitals will be constructed in this
region as opposed to other parts of the country)–local grief, national reach.10
4.2 Complementary results
A natural extension of the previous results is to analyze how the response might diﬀer
across the type of respondents. Following the predictions of our theoretical framework, we
expect respondents to react diﬀerently to the observation at the origin of the social conﬂict
depending on their environment (access to information, public infrastructures...) but not
on their type (ethnicity). To this end, we take advantage of objective characteristics of
respondents and of information documented by interviewers.
The ﬁrst non-subjective information we exploit consists in respondents’ ethnicity. This
characteristics may to some extent capture ex-ante diﬀerences between individuals. These
diﬀerences should not make them potential losers or winners from leaders’ actions. In table
11 in appendix, we split the sample of Afrobarometer’s respondents between those who
belong to the main ethnic group in the country (panel A) and those who do not (panel B).
Both groups change their subjective membership of the national community in very similar
ways when social conﬂicts occur. In table 12 in appendix, we consider the main ethnic group
in the region (panel A) against the others (panel B). Heterogeneity in responses is even less
clear then. All in all, changes in distrust in leaders, institutions, and in beliefs in the national
coordination is similar across the diﬀerent ethnic groups following local social conﬂicts.
In the Afrobarometer, interviewers are asked to ﬁll some questions about the existence
of some facilities in the primary sample area. We use this information as a proxy for the
10Note that the decreasing pattern of coeﬃcients as distance increase is not obvious for all dependent
variables across tables 1, 7, 8, and 9. Formal tests of this pattern are presented in table 10, presented in
appendix, for two of the dependent variables.
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success of public projects. We construct an individual index of access to public goods that
ranges from 0 to 5 as the sum of dummies when any of the following facility is present in
the primary sample unit: clinic, electricity, school, police, or water.11 We then compute the
average of this index by country and wave and we split the sample between individuals whose
access to public goods is above or below the average access to public goods in the country.
Panel A of table 3 (respectively, panel B) displays the response of respondents with relatively
more (less) access to public goods. Recent social conﬂicts have a larger eﬀect among those
who have relatively less access to public goods (see table 3). This result applies to trust
in the president, trust in the ruling party, trust in the electoral commission, trust in the
parliament, trust in the local government, and trust in the traditional leaders. Interestingly,
those who have relatively more access to public goods seems to react even more to protests
when looking at subjective membership of the national community. They may anticipate
the reaction of their disadvantaged peers and expect to see less investment from them. In
general, however, the response is larger for individuals living in an environment with low
public expenditures.
These results paint social conﬂicts as arising from misbehaviors of leaders. We uncover
some heterogeneity which may be related to the local environment. Importantly, the re-
sponses do not seem to diﬀer along ethnicity. This observation limits the extent to which
these social conﬂicts reﬂect ethnic disagreements with leaders favoring systematically one of
the party.
So far we have identiﬁed shocks on beliefs and sentiments to be part of a country but we
don’t know whether they are permanent or purely transitory. The structure of the data (two
repeated cross-section distant from several years) is not appropriate to estimate an impulse
response following social conﬂicts. The only potential strategy is to use the variation in
the time interval between a conﬂict and the interview and aggregate those disconnected
observations to deduce an impulse response. An issue is that the speciﬁcation with region
ﬁxed eﬀects would be hard to interpret: the diﬀerential between a district and other districts
of the same region can fade away either because beliefs have reverted back in the district, or
because distrust has propagated to the neighbours. Consequently, we only consider country
ﬁxed eﬀects and study the inﬂuence of the occurrence of conﬂicts in a 20 kilometer radius
and in the administrative region.
We expect the dynamic evolution of beliefs to be diﬀerent depending on the likelihood
of social conﬂicts. In a country plagued by social conﬂicts, beliefs on fundamentals are less
likely to be revised than in countries where such signals are rare. To capture this idea, we
11In our sample of Afrobarometer’s respondents, the average value of this index equals 2.57 and the
standard deviations is equal to 1.52.
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split the sample between regions whose propensity to social conﬂicts is above or below the
75th percentile administrative region of the sample.12
Accounting for those remarks, we run a slightly diﬀerent speciﬁcation than our baseline
one:
yi = α +
L∑
k=1
βj,kCj,t−k +
L∑
k=1
βr,kCr,t−k +
n∑
k=1
γkx
k
i +
m∑
k=1
φkX
k
j + Ic + εi, (4)
where individual i lives in place j inside region r of country c and has been interviewed
at time t. Other notations are as speciﬁed in expression (3), except that Cj,t−1 decribes
social conﬂicts that occured in a 20 kilometer radius around place j during the quarter
immediately preceding the interview, and Cj,t−2 decribes social conﬂicts that occured within
the same area during the second quarter preceding the interview, etc. Variables Cr,t−k echo
these quantities at the administrative region level. βj,k is the local response after k quarters
and βr,k is the response in neighboring districts after the same time. Here, we arbitrarily set
L = 3 for expository purposes.
Figure 2(a) to 2(f) plot the changes induced by one more conﬂict during the three quarters
immediately preceding the interview in a 20 kilometer radius and in the administrative
region. Coeﬃcients are estimated from expression (4), using trust in the president, trust in
the parliament, and trust in the electoral commission as dependent variables.
As shown by 2(a), recent social conﬂicts have no statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on trust in
the president during the ﬁrst two quarters in regions with low exposure to social conﬂicts.
The eﬀect shows up during the third quarter and is virtually identical depending on whether
the event took place in the surrounding districts or in the immediate neighborhood. The
evolution is rather diﬀerent in regions with high past exposure to social conﬂicts as shown
by 2(b). In these regions, trust in the president return to there initial level after one quarter.
To conclude, the propagation across the country is immediate. However, in regions not often
aﬀected, the eﬀect is slow to materialize but indicates a more fundamental revision of beliefs
than in riots-prone regions. As shown by ﬁgures 2(c) to (f), the same dynamic feature appear
for trust in institutions such as the parliament or the electoral commission. All in all, these
results show that the persistence of the shocks diﬀer in regions frequently exposed compared
with regions where signals of discontentment are rare
Finally, we look at diﬀerences in reaction along diﬀerences in local ethnic polarization.
For each place, we computed a fractionalization index following Alesina et al. (2003) and
split the sample with respect to the median value.13 As shown by estimated coeﬃcients
12Choosing the median rather than the 75th percentile to split the sample does not aﬀect qualitatively the
results presented below.
13Unlike polarization index à la Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005), this fractionalization index increases
as the number of small groups in the population increases. It reaches a minimum when the population is
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presented in table 13 in appendix, most reactions following social conﬂict take place in less
fractionalized places. Interestingly, individuals living in more fractionalized places only revise
their priors regarding the president and their subjective member of the national community.
This can be interpreted as reﬂecting the fact that it is more convenient for leaders to cheat
on isolated individuals, i.e. on individuals that live in fractionalized places. As a reaction,
they do not revise their trust toward monitoring institutions as the latter would not be able
anyway to protect them against misbehaving leaders.
5 Conclusion
This paper identiﬁes the volatility of beliefs in leaders and institutions in the aftermath of
protests. Our ﬁndings support the existence of diﬀerent regimes in social coordination with
sudden switches and explain unexpected overthrows. Our interpretation is that misbehaviors
of leaders seem to be a spark which drags down beliefs in institutions and national cooper-
ation. Estimates suggest that a series of social conﬂicts is able to drive beliefs very far from
their initial level. Even though leaders might change, the shock will drive down beliefs in
fundamentals and consequently expectations in future coordination.
Yet, we can identify three limits to our work. First, we consider as an interesting feature
of our empirical framework that it relies on very localized responses and small time windows.
It allows a cleaner identiﬁcation than a macro-analysis. It would be however very interesting
to capture the propagation of distrust over time and regions. The implication of our results
would be quite diﬀerent if the eﬀect was ampliﬁed nation-wide or conﬁned to a city or a
district. Unfortunately, such an analysis is hardly implementable: surveys are not conducted
frequently enough.
Second, empirical observations presented in this paper match predictions from a simple
theoretical framework. In this framework, taxes are voluntary contributions and agents can
refuse to provide any tax revenue to a corrupted state. This trait accounts for the possibility
to invest more or less in the state eﬀort. An extension would be to test the response of real
economic counterparts, i.e. the size of tax revenues and capture long-run changes in the
weakness of the state.
Finally, we cannot fully rule out competing explanations for our empirical results. First,
we can be capturing a behavioral response of agents. After a protest, they feel more secure
when declaring that they distrust the government. Such a behavioral response is possible but
contradicts the observation that the response tends to be even stronger when the government
formed by a single group and a maximum when the population is formed by an inﬁnite number if small
groups.
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violently represses the protests. Second, the revision on the institutions may reﬂect that
the riot in itself questions the future viability of the state: agents revise their beliefs not
because of a misbehavior of leaders but because the protest announces periods of unrest.
This interpretation is not consistent with the diﬀerences along the access to public goods.
In addition, we ﬁnd that the amplitude of responses after riots repressed byt he government
tend to be larger than for riots unrepressed.
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Figure 1: Daily empirical probability of conﬂicts before and after the date of interview.
For places where people have been interviewed in the Afrobarometer, the ﬁgure plots the daily empirical probability of social
conﬂicts before and after the interview.
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Figure 2: Dynamic response to social conﬂicts.
(a) Trust in the president in regions with low ex-
posure to social conﬂicts.
(b) Trust in the president in regions with high
exposure to social conﬂicts.
(c) Trust in the parliament in regions with low
exposure to social conﬂicts.
(d) Trust in the parliament in regions with high
exposure to social conﬂicts.
(e) Trust in the electoral commission in regions
with low exposure to social conﬂicts.
(f) Trust in the electoral commission in regions
with high exposure to social conﬂicts.
The ﬁgures plot the estimated coeﬃcients from separate regressions of trust in the president, in the parliament, and in the
electoral commission on conﬂicts in a 20 kilometers radius and in the administrative region during the three quarters preceding
the interview. All regressions include individual and local characteristics as in other regressions presented in this paper, except
that region × round ﬁxed eﬀects have been replaced by country × round ﬁxed eﬀects. Conﬁdence intervals around point
estimates correspond to the 95% conﬁdence interval. The sample is split according to the 75th percentile administrative region
of the sample in term of past exposure to social conﬂicts.
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Table 1: Eﬀect of recent social conﬂicts on trust in leaders and in institutions.
Dependent variables in columns’ heads.
Panel A: Trust in leaders
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Trust in Trust in Trust in Trust in Trust in Trust in
Opp. party President Ruling party Opp. party President Ruling party
Social conﬂicts 0.038*** -0.065*** -0.036***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
Social conﬂicts 0.071 -0.157*** -0.073
repressed by the gov. (0.046) (0.047) (0.048)
Observations 37,769 39,470 38,800 37,769 39,470 38,800
R-squared 0.115 0.272 0.253 0.115 0.271 0.253
Panel B: Trust in institutions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Trust in Trust in Trust in Trust in Trust in Trust in
Army Electoral Comm. Parliament Army Electoral Comm. Parliament
Social conﬂicts 0.003 -0.040*** -0.014
(0.014) (0.011) (0.011)
Social conﬂicts -0.221** -0.090* -0.056
repressed by the gov. (0.095) (0.047) (0.045)
Observations 17,973 37,049 38,242 17,973 37,049 38,242
R-squared 0.305 0.250 0.208 0.305 0.250 0.208
Panel C: Feeling to be part of a nation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Trust in Trust in National Trust in Trust in National
Local gov. Trad. leaders Feeling Local gov. Trad. leaders Feeling
Social conﬂicts -0.011 0.029 -0.007
(0.010) (0.024) (0.013)
Social conﬂicts -0.070 0.139* -0.148**
repressed by the gov. (0.043) (0.078) (0.063)
Observations 38,086 19,744 38,586 38,086 19,744 38,586
R-squared 0.198 0.174 0.188 0.198 0.174 0.188
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. OLS regressions. All regressions include region ×
round ﬁxed eﬀects and a constant term. The following co-variates are also included: age gender, a dummy equal to 1 if the
respondent is household head, dummies for race and religion, a dummy equal to 1 if housing is rural, dummies for education
level and employment status, dummies equal to 1 if the respondent belong to the main or the second ethnic group in country
or region, past battles and social conﬂicts in a 20 kilometers radius, the (log of) the distance to the coast, and the (log of)
population in a 20 kilometers radius. Social conﬂicts is the number of social conﬂicts in a 20 kilometers radius over the
month immediately preceding the interview. Social conﬂicts repressed by the government include only events repressed by the
government. See the text for the deﬁnition of dependent variables.
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Appendix
Table 4: Descriptive statistics: average observable characteristics of respondents.
Recent social conﬂicts Past social concﬂicts
Full sample > 0 = 0 > 0 = 0
Age 35.922 32.514 36.181 34.395 36.826
Male 0.504 0.501 0.504 0.504 0.504
Household head 0.485 0.436 0.488 0.478 0.488
White 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.005
Mixed 0.007 0.017 0.006 0.008 0.006
Other 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004
Islam 0.253 0.199 0.257 0.203 0.282
Catholic / Protestant 0.687 0.768 0.681 0.748 0.651
Traditional religion 0.02 0.007 0.021 0.012 0.025
Other 0.012 0.004 0.012 0.013 0.011
Rural housing 0.657 0.24 0.689 0.484 0.76
Primary school 0.353 0.22 0.363 0.305 0.381
Secondary school 0.333 0.485 0.321 0.41 0.287
Post-secondary education 0.1 0.21 0.091 0.152 0.069
Unemployed 0.315 0.344 0.312 0.3 0.323
Par time 0.15 0.167 0.149 0.156 0.146
Full time 0.196 0.224 0.194 0.214 0.186
Main ethnic group in region 0.494 0.546 0.49 0.454 0.517
Main ethnic group in country 0.279 0.288 0.278 0.255 0.293
Second ethnic group in region 0.141 0.138 0.142 0.141 0.142
Second ethnic group in region 0.171 0.11 0.175 0.171 0.17
Past battles 2.489 7.291 2.124 6.486 0.123
Past social conﬂicts 9.303 87.6 3.361 25.022 0
Past social conﬂicts repressed by the gov. 2.022 21.957 0.509 5.438 0
Distance to the coast 5.52 5.214 5.543 5.228 5.693
Local population 9.72 13.267 9.451 11.502 8.666
Observations 40,713 2,872 37,841 15,137 25,576
Except age, past battles, past social conﬂicts, past social conﬂicts repressed by the government, distance to the coast, and local
population, all variables are dummy variables. The reference category for white, mixed, and other is “black”. The reference
category for education’s levels is “no formal education”. The reference category for employment status is “inactive”. Variables
distance to the coast, and local population are used in logarithm. Out of the 40, 713 respondents, 18, 637 have been interviewed
in round 3 of the Afrobarometer and 22, 076 in round 4.
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Table 5: Descriptive statistics: average answers of respondents.
Unit of observation: respondent
Recent social conﬂicts Past social concﬂicts
Full sample > 0 = 0 > 0 = 0
Trust in opposition party 1.22 (1.07) 1.25 1.22 1.23 1.21
Trust in president 1.92 (1.12) 1.34 1.96 1.73 2.06
Trust in ruling party 1.66 (1.15) 1.13 1.70 1.46 1.81
Trust in army 1.95 (1.11) 1.49 1.99 1.84 2.05
Trust in electoral commission 1.61 (1.13) 1.14 1.65 1.40 1.78
Tust in parliament 1.71 (1.08) 1.37 1.74 1.55 1.84
Trust in local government 1.64 (1.10) 1.32 1.66 1.49 1.76
Trust in traditional leaders 1.97 (1.08) 1.82 1.98 1.83 2.07
National feeling 3.47 (1.20) 3.36 3.47 3.45 3.48
Unit of observation: place
Recent social conﬂicts Past social concﬂicts
Full sample > 0 = 0 > 0 = 0
Trust in opposition party 1.23 (0.51) 1.10 1.24 1.18 1.26
Trust in president 1.92 (0.69) 1.28 1.94 1.68 2.04
Trust in ruling party 1.65 (0.68) 1.08 1.67 1.41 1.77
Trust in army 1.86 (0.76) 1.27 1.89 1.66 1.97
Trust in electoral commission 1.61 (0.68) 1.11 1.63 1.35 1.74
Tust in parliament 1.72 (0.63) 1.25 1.74 1.51 1.83
Trust in local government 1.63 (0.62) 1.15 1.65 1.42 1.75
Trust in traditional leaders 1.95 (0.58) 1.66 1.96 1.77 2.04
National feeling 3.45 (0.66) 3.29 3.45 3.41 3.46
See the text for the deﬁnitions of the diﬀerent variables. Standard deviations in parentheses. In the upper part of the table,
statistics are computed using respondents as observation’s units. In the bottom part of the table, individual observations have
been averaged by place before the computations of statistics.
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Table 10: Formal tests of the decreasing relationship between matching’s radius and the
eﬀect of social conﬂicts.
P-values for H0: βi > βj
β estimated when the dependent variable is trust
in the president and all social conﬂicts are taken
into account.
β estimated when the dependent variable is na-
tional feeling and only social conﬂicts repressed by
the government are taken into account.
βj ’s radius βj ’s radius
βi’s radius 10 km 20 km 40 km βi’s radius 10 km 20 km 40 km
5 km 0.095 0.092 0.069 5 km 0.385 0.824 0.152
10 km 0.196 0.136 10 km 0.958 0.152
20 km 0.254 20 km 0.007
The table presents p-values associated to the following hypothesis: βi > βj , where βi and βj are the coeﬃcients associated to
recent social conﬂicts for the same dependent variable but for diﬀerent matching’s radius. The left part of the table corresponds
to tests of coeﬃcients estimated when the dependent variable is trust in the president and all social conﬂicts are taken into
account (column 2 in panel A of table 1 and columns 2 of tables 7, 8, and 9). The right part of the table correspond to tests
of coeﬃcients estimated when the dependent variable is national feeling and only social conﬂicts repressed by the government
are taken into account (column 6 in panel C of table 1 and columns 18 of tables 7, 8, and 9).
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Online appendix
Geo-location of Afrobarometer’s respondents
This section presents procedures used to geo-locate respondents interviewed in rounds 3 and
4 of the Afrobarometer.
Relevant information in the Afrobarometer
Rounds 3 and 4 of the Afrobarometer survey give names of the country and the region
in which respondents are living, but also the name of the “district”.14 The precise deﬁni-
tion of the latter information varies across countries and do not always match with oﬃcial
administrative areas.
All in all, the two rounds of the Afrobarometer list 2, 377 diﬀerent places where 53, 110
respondents live. They are disseminated in 20 diﬀerent countries. The procedures presented
below allow to locate all places and respondents.
Geo-location procedures
Following Nunn and Wantchekon (2011), we use the website GeoNames.org15 to ﬁnd ge-
ographical coordinates of places listed in the Afrobaromter. This website allows to send
precise requests using names of places, but makes also publicly available background data.
These data contains the latitude and the longitude of a tremendous number of places around
the world. Documentation attached to each place also include variations of its name. We
ﬁrst used an algorithm to search for Afrobarometer’s places that can me located using names
or variations of names proposed in data from GeoNames.org. We then changed the name
of some places registered with evident accents errors or typos in the Afrobarometer and ran
the same process as above.16 This ﬁrst step allowed to get the geographical coordinates of
more than 80% of places.
The second method we used for places not yet located is simply made of individual hand
requests to retrieve information on GeoNames.org taken over from Wikipedia.org.17 Still
un-matched places where located using other websites: MapAtlas.org, iTouchMap.com, and
Fallingrain.com.18 Among places located using one of the latter websites, around one third
14Respondents interviewed in Lesotho during round 4 represent an exception. Only the name of the region
is available for these observations.
15http://www.geonames.org
16For example, “Abeïbara” in Mali does not match with data from GeoNames.org whereas “Abeibara”
does. Similarly, the suﬃxes “urban” or “municipal” are added to the name of some cities.
17http://www.wikipedia.org
18http://en.mapatlas.org, http://itouchmap.com, and http://www.fallingrain.com.
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were located using the centroid of the region as we were not able to determine the location
of the district within the administrative region.
Finally, we used a geographic information system to look for potential mismatches. We
found out that the longitude and the latitude of 16 places located them in wrong coun-
tries. This was mostly the case for places very close to a boundary. We manually change
geographical coordinates of these places using the same websites as above.
Table 14 summarizes the number of places located using one of the above described
matching procedures. Table 15 presents the associated frequency of individual observations
in rounds 3 and 4 of the Afrobarometer. Table 16 decomposes table 14 by country. Finally,
ﬁgure 4 represents the points where interviewed individuals are located.
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Figure 3: Location of civil conﬂicts and riots.
(a) All events (including civil wars).
(b) Riots.
Source: ACLED (1997-2009).
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Figure 4: Location of respondents interviewed in rounds 3 and 4 of the Afrobarometer.
Source: Authors’ localization using the Afrobarometer. See the text for details.
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Table 14: Distribution of successful matching processes at the place level.
Places Percentage
Geonames.org 1,615 67.94
Geonames.org (2) 467 19.65
Hand requests on Geonames.org 87 3.66
Hand requests on diﬀerent websites 126 5.30
Hand requests on diﬀerent websites (2) 66 2.78
Hand corrections 16 0.67
Total 2,377 100.00
Geonames.org refers to places located using data from Geonames.org. Geonames.org (2) refers to places located using data
from Geonames.org after names corrections. Hand requests on Geonames.org refers to places located using information
on GeoNames.org taken over from Wikipedia.org. Hand requests on diﬀerent websites refers to places located using
MapAtlas.org, iTouchMap.com, and Fallingrain.com. Hand requests on diﬀerent websites (2) refers to places located at
the region level using the latter method. Hand corrections refers to places whose location was corrected because of proximity
from countries’ boundaries. See the text for more details.
Table 15: Distribution of successful matching processes at the respondent level.
Respondents Percentage
Geonames.org 40,962 77.13
Geonames.org (2) 8,837 16.64
Hand requests on Geonames.org 892 1.68
Hand requests on diﬀerent websites 1,558 2.93
Hand requests on diﬀerent websites (2) 561 1.06
Hand corrections 300 0.56
Total 53,110 100.00
See footnote of table 14.
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